This paper discusses the development of labor law in Indonesia after the 1998 reformasi. The end of the authoritarian regime and the subsequent introduction of democratic institutions in the country have opened up new spaces to restructure labor relations. The government promulgated a set of new labor laws that has brought tremendous changes to the employment system and the system of labor disputes settlement. In the face of the challenges these changes have created, labor unions are using alternative means to defend their members' interests. This paper shows how labor law reform has set a new social contract between the government, employer associations, and the labor movement.
For many developing countries in Asia, formulating a national economic policy, including policies around the domestic labor market, is key to reaching development targets. Such a policy is often designed according to industrial and macro-economic preferences, with the general idea to integrate resources, including labor, for an economic development that is believed will bring welfare for the nation's entire population. In practical terms, it involves how the working population is utilized and later regulated to run the nation's economy. However, as most of these countries are still struggling to overcome a number of institutional problems in policy formulation, the road to transform the national economy is not smooth. Indonesia is a case in point (Dhanani et al. 2010 ).
This article discusses the changes in labor laws after the 1998 reformasi in Indonesia as a process of integrating and regulating labor within the nation's economic program. These changes are part of the nation's attempt to reform all of its legal institutions to address the chronic problems of corruption and cronyism, and to cut down its notorious time-consuming and expensive legal procedures (Gray 1991 ) under a general program of "good governance." They were also an attempt to respond to the demand of the market forces to integrate Indonesia into the global economy. Specifically in terms of labor law, these changes included a re-arrangement of institutions that neutralized the labor movement and ensured a business-friendly environment.
The pattern of change that took place in Indonesia is not an unusual one; it can be observed in other developing countries in Asia (and in other regions, as well) where there is a need to reform labor law The Making of a New Social Contract: Labor Law in Indonesia after Reformasi 87 and its "outdated" institutions to obtain some fresh features of "transparency" in the legal system (Gallagher and Dong 2011; Mitchell et al. 2014; Tekle 2010) . At the same time, there is also a political pressure to make post-war labor law more responsive to the liberalization of the market economy (Carse and Njoya 2015; Novick et al. 2009 ). In that sense, labor law after reformasi 1998 was transformed not merely to install some elements of "good governance," but also, and primarily, to answer the economic challenges that Indonesia began-and continues to-face in the globalized market. Davies and Feedland (2007: 5) sum up the pattern of reform this way:
"…labour law began to move out of the zone of 'social law' and worker protection, and became part of a larger and rather different vision of labour market regulation in the interests of a free market economy."
As has also been observed in other countries, these changes to labor law are not only considered to be addressing contemporary economic challenges, but are also used to rationalize the state and its apparatus to uphold certain values under "democracy promotion" 1) and to provide the state with necessary legal foundations to regulate the economy-including, to restrain labor-within the rhetoric of the "rule of law" (Teitelbaum 2011) . Initially, Indonesian unions, similar to labor movements in post-authoritarian societies elsewhere, welcomed the democratic opening of the reformasi. As these legal 1) For general discussion on "democracy promotion," see Murphy (2012) ; Sukma (2011). changes unfolded, however, unions started to question the reform's liberal trajectories and market oriented agendas. Therefore, this paper argues that the changing nature of labor law after the 1998 reformasi needs to be seen as a negotiation (albeit, an unequal one) between the state and its working population for a new social contract. This new social contract operates under a liberal conception of law, which exists, to quote Klare (1982: 65) , "to promote an ideology and evolve a set of institutions that legitimate and reinforce socially unnecessary hierarchy in the workplace."
This article starts with a description of the institutional changes around labor that began a few months after the reformasi 1998 and Institutional re-arrangement: [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] Once considered by the World Bank as an example of the "East Asian Miracle," Indonesia's New Order began to crumble with the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The economic growth rate plummeted, bringing down the government with it. In September 1998, just three months after the resignation of the authoritarian president Suharto, the Ministry of Manpower adopted Labor Law Reform as its formal working agenda. Fahmi Idris, the then Minister of Manpower in the Habibie interregnum cabinet, signed a technical assistance agreement with the International Labour Organization (ILO) soon after an ILO Direct Contact Mission to Indonesia in August 1998. The technical assistance was for a "review, revision, formulation or reformulation of practically all labor legislation with a view to modernizing and making them more relevant to and in step with the changing times and requirements of a free market economy..." (ILO 1999:19) .
With the ILO's technical assistance, Indonesia's new government quickly ratified five main ILO conventions and by 2000, the country had become the first in Asia to ratify all eight fundamental ILO conventions (see Table 1 ). It was seen as an accomplishment and was soon followed by a bigger assistance project financed by the United States Department of Labor.
2) The ILO/USA Declaration Project Indonesia lasted for almost 5 years (February 2001 -December 2006 and can be viewed as an endeavor to "transplant" laws (Watson 1996) or to advance the "legal culture" of human rights principles from developed (Western) nations to a developing one. The project has, indeed, introduced progressive concepts and institutions whose purpose is to protect workers' rights in Indonesia. However, as a technical assistance project, it has had limited impacts on the drafting system. Accordingly, employers are permitted to employ workers on a contract basis with a specified term of up to two years that is renewable for another term of up to one year (Articles 57, 58, and 59). 9) It also allows firms, in certain industries, to hand over 6) Article 77 states that any employer is under obligation to observe the regulation on working hours. Working hours are arranged as follows: 7 hours per day and 40 hours per week for 6 working days in a week, or 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week for 5 working days in a week. Article 79 states that any employer is under obligation to allow its workers to take a rest and leave. 7) Article 69 states that the employment of children aged between 13 years old and 15 years old for light work shall be permitted as long as the job does not stunt or disrupt their physical, mental, and social development. Article 74 states that it is forbidden to employ and involve children in the worst forms of child labor. 8) It is worthy to note that in certain areas (such as working hours, occupational health and safety, and child labor), Law no. 12 Year 1948 also provides the same protective provisions as Law no.13 Year 2003. 9) Article 57 states that a work agreement for a specified period of time shall be made in writing and must be written in the Indonesian language with Latin alphabets. Article "auxiliary activities" to other firms, under outsourcing practices (Articles 64, 65, and 66). 10) Although contract-based employment relations and outsourcing were not new in Indonesia prior to 1998, these provisions are controversial because they legalize, instead of prohibit, the spread of an atypical-and less regulated/regulatablelabor system in the formal sector. Notwithstanding this issue, these provisions were, and are, deemed necessary in order to make the labor market "more flexible," which in turn will "solve manpower issues"
and "create economic growth that produces employment" (Ikhsan 2004 ).
As (4) states that a work agreement for a specified period of time can be made for a period of no longer than 2 years and can only be extended once for one period no longer than 1 year. 10) Article 64 states that an enterprise may sub-contract part of its work to another enterprise under a written agreement of contract of work or a contract to supply labor. Article 66 (1) states that workers from a labor supplier must not be employed to carry out the enterprise's main activities or activities that are directly related to the production process, with the exception of auxiliary service activities or activities that are indirectly related to the production process.
is staffed by judges (with a composition of one career judge and two ad-hoc judges, respectively representing labor and employer associations). 11) Accordingly, its litigation procedure is based on formal civil procedures (with slight modifications), 12) which positions individual workers as common laypersons who need legal assistance from lawyers or experienced paralegals. Thus, under this new dispute settlement system, workers are forced to seek legal expertise that many unions are still lacking.
The new system also promotes the individualization of labor relations by granting access to any individual worker to bring a case to the court without having to be represented by a labor union. This is contrary to the previous dispute settlement system under P4D/P, which acknowledged the organizational standing of the union to represent and defend individual workers. Therefore, the new system undermined the ability of labor unions to defend the collective interests of workers just as they were beginning to develop institutional capacities in the post-1998 environment.
On paper, the legal frameworks and institutions established by both 11) Article 1 (17) states that an Industrial Relations Court is a special court established within the aegis of the District Court that has the authority to review, bring to court and provide a verdict concerning an industrial relations dispute. and coherent with an agenda of protecting labor rights. They are designed to guarantee the basic rights and freedom of workers within a democratic environment that the government seeks to cultivate.
They are also created to establish legal foundations that enable Indonesia's working population to compete in the regional and global economies. However, while such an analysis of the letter and structure of the laws contains some valid points, it fails to evaluate several crucial aspects of the laws regarding their formulation, content, and impacts on labor-the sector these laws precisely wish to govern.
The labor movement has raised concerns about the formulation of these laws, despite the participation of some unions in some of the consultation sessions organized by the government and the chair of the parliamentary commission on labor issues. The main concern is that labor's voices were not heard or taken into consideration during the drafting process of these laws. 13) Even when some labor leaders attended meetings, their participation was merely used to justify provisions they were not aware or informed of earlier. The formulation process therefore clearly puts into question the representation and legitimacy of the laws.
In terms of the content of the laws, a number of economic analyses, notwithstanding their neo-classical background, 14) have pointed out contradictions in the assumptions that Law no. 13 Year 2013 makes 13) There was no debate in the Parliament when the laws were promulgated. Most of the changes were related to specific wording and technicalities of the bills. 14) Mishra (2004) notes that the "combination of market liberalization and the minimalist state which lies at the heart of traditional neo-classical economic thinking, although already under attack by mainstream economists, still dominates professional thinking on economic affairs in Indonesia today."
about the labor market (Manning 2004; Manning and Roesad 207) .
For example, the provisions on hiring and firing of workers are considered biased toward formal employment, thus ignoring the vast majority of Indonesia's working population in the informal sector and creating legal barriers for low paid workers and the unemployed. 17) The last time the parliament was forced to postpone the enactment of a bill happened more than two decades ago in 1974 regarding the Marriage Law. Thus, it was such a rare experience that a social group could pose a strong pressure, and considered as a political threat, against the parliament to enact a bill.
It was thus not a surprise when, upon the law's promulgation on Table 3 ). It is interesting to note that there are more judicial review submissions on Law no. Although winning these legal battles provides some pathway for unions to demand a change, the labor movement is still far from court system (and are encouraged to do so), it is difficult for s/he 19) Union leaders have complained that most of the reports by the Directorate General of Labour Inspectorate on company infringements or violations at the factory level simply remain on paper without any further follow-up. They also note that workers doubt the credibility and ability of some regional labor inspectors to do their job, as they are not fully aware of their specified responsibilities and in their ignorance, tend to "exploit the case" (to extort money from the employers to be on their side), instead of investigate it properly.
to have an equal footing in defending his/her interests alone before the Industrial Dispute Court without being backed up by a union's organizational power. Table 4 ). and their need to take unconventional routes to make their voices heard and their presence visible for the public. 22) In some areas, like in Bekasi -a major industrial city near Jakarta, this direct action strategy gave rise to the "grebek pabrik" (factory raid), a strategy to sanction employer's legal infringements and/ or settle labor disputes informally (Mufakhir 2014) . Factory raid combines and includes various direct actions by the union to pressure employer to comply with the law (upon their infringements) and accept union's demands for improvements at the workplace. 23) Street protest and factory raid 22) In a comparative study of Chinese workers, Lee (2007:232) notes that "(m)any incidents of workers blocking traffic, demonstration outside government buildings, or marching through downtown streets have their origins in mass outrage against official failure to redress legal and legitimate grievances."
are the most common strategies unions use as "alternative ways" to settle disputes. From here we could understand why unions why unions take the risk of using alternative ways to settle labor disputes rather than utilize the law: to attract public attention to labor conditions, the lack of government assistance to workers, and to the labor cause more broadly. A cause that, unfortunately, has been undercut in the context of globalisation that redefines-not reduces-government roles in social issues, including labor dispute settlement. Unlike under Law 23) Despite offering immediate outcomes to settle a dispute, there is a deep concern that the overuse of the factory raid as a strategy may cause disputes to be left unsettled and bring backlash against union activism. There has been a steady decrease in cases of factory raids since late 2013. 24) In this context, it is not a surprise that the labor movement shows its contempt against the Gubernatorial Regulation of Jakarta no. 228 Year 2015 (Peraturan Gubernur Provinsi Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta) on the management of public expression of opinions in open spaces. The regulation restricts the location of all kinds of demonstration, including those organized by the labor movement, to three designated public areas (Article 4) only and limits when they can take place to within a specific timeframe (from 6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) (Article 5).
no . The regulation states that the provincial minimum wage will be set 26) Article 88 (4) states that the government shall set minimum wage based on decent living needs, by taking into account productivity and economic growth. 27) To boost its comparative advantages in the regional competition, the Indonesian government has been campaigning for cheap labor and thus, the issue of workers' demonstrations may hinder the government's efforts to provide the best climate for foreign investors to consider the country as a desirable destination. Within the business community, there is indeed a fear of labor militancy.
in accordance with inflation and national economic growth rates.
Since it is only the (central) government that determines both these rates (based on the report of the Central Bureau of Statistics), the regulation effectively put the role of setting the minimum wage squarely in the hands of the government, no longer relying on the Decent Living Needs (KHL) as negotiated in the Wage Councils.
Unions instantly protested the Regulation and organized a national strike to force the government to revoke it. Undeterred, the non-compliance (a maximum of 4 years imprisonment or a 400 million Rupiah fine), over the years no legal measure has been taken against employers who pay workers below the minimum wage. In one instance, the regional Department of Manpower office in Jakarta district stated that during the year 2004, approximately 100 companies operating in the district paid their workers below the minimum wage, but no sanction against them was decided (Harian Jakarta, February 1, 2005).
Conclusion
After 
